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ADVOCACY PLANNING IN CLEVELAND
Lecture by Norman Krumholz, Director Cleveland City Planning Commission
for the Department of City and Regional Planning - University of California, Berkeley, California, October 10, 1973

Four years ago I joined the administration of Mayor Carl B. Stokes
as Planning Director of the City of Cleveland.

It is not clear that

Mayor Stokes had any idea of what to do with me at first, but the body
to which I am officially responsible —

the City Planning Commission

had some very clear ideas on high-priority work assignments.

—

One Com-

mission member (a planning professor interested in land use control)
wanted a completely new zoning ordinance; another (a downtown businessman) wanted a downtown-revitalization study; a third (a banker) thought
that a study aimed at straightening out the winding Cuyahoga River
would help straighten out the city's problems as well.

For my part,

my intent was to gather up all the resources at my command and plunge
forward with a new long range land use plan.

Luckily, a few newly-hired staff members and I paused to consider
the City of Cleveland and its people instead of the guidelines of
current American planning practice.

We saw an old industrial city,

with a sharply declining population and diminishing shares of the
regional economy in every sector.

We saw an old housing stock,

deteriorating quickly, with the phenomena of disinvestment and
abandonment already well-established.

We saw a blue-collar population,

white and black, without significant percentages of the rich and the

.2.

middle-class most of whom had long-since departed for the suburbs.
We saw a population with a 1970 median family income of $9,100 where
about 1/3 of all households had annual incomes of less than $5,000,
where 79,000 households lacked the mobility provided by an automobile,
where crime and racial hostility and segregation were high and
apparently rising.

It became obvious to us that development of a comprehensive long
range land use plan - even a brand-new zoning ordinance - would be
irrelevant if not actually counter-productive.

The elements of the

urban crisis in Cleveland and in other older cities of this nation
have little to do with land use.

They have to do with poverty, racism,

social alienation, crime, bad housing and they cannot be directly,
nor meaningfully, attacked with the city planner's traditional bag
of tools.

We could have ignored or suppressed this realization and proceeded
toward an updated version of Cleveland's 1949 Land Use Plan.

(It is

worth noting here that few people in city government understand just
what it is that city planners are supposed to do, and the confusion
seems to extend to many members of the planning profession.

Once we

planners satisfy the narrow responsibilities mandated by v our City
Charter, we have great freedom to decide our own roles, responsibilities
and work programs.)

It was our choice, then, to by-pass the land use

plan and to begin instead our first halting steps toward a new vision
for Cleveland, new directions for our institutions, and a role for the
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,

Cleveland Planning Commission worthy of our efforts and resources.

The vision, or our over-riding goal, is simple.

It can be stated

in a short series of logical steps which focus on individual freedom
and institutional responsibility:
—

Individuals choose their own goals and means to pursue
those goals.
—

Institutions are established to serve individuals in
their pursuit of their own goals.

In the process in-

stitutions, themselves, establish goals —

some of

which must be self-serving to assure their survival.
--

Institutional

goals which are self-serving, however,

must be clearly secondary to those which further the
pursuit of individual goals.
—

Both individuals and institutions pursue their respective
goals through decision and action.

Decisions to act must

be made from among those choices of action which the individual or institution perceives.
--

Individuals are better off with more choices in any
decision.

—

Institutions serve individual goals most when they provide
wider choices in decisions made by individuals.

—

The primary goal of institutions must be to provide
wider choices to individuals through institutional
decisions and actions.
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—

In a context of limited resources, institutions should
give first and priority attention to the task of promoting wider choices for those individuals and groups
who have few, if any choices.

In short, the advice, information and recommendations offered by
the Cleveland City Planning Commission would be primarily directed
toward the accomplishment of this single, simply-stated goal:
—

Simple equity requires that locally-responsible government
institutions - with limited powers and resources - should
give first and priority attention to the goal of promoting
wider choices (more alternatives and opportunities) for
those individuals and groups in the City of Cleveland who
have few, if any choices.

We are aware that this goal places us in a clear advocate position
in favor of those who have few, or no, choices.

We understand that its

successful pursuit will require no less than a fundamental redistribution
of income and power in our society.

But we are convinced that such

a goal is not Utopian, it is not radical, nor is it altruistic or
benevolent.

It is a familiar goal, rooted in the egalitarian ideals

of our birth and growth as a nation.

It is ultimately, a just goal;

one that seeks a society where equity is at least as important as
efficiency.

I hope in these introductory remarks I have established the concern
for "advocacy" or "equity" which guides the day-to-day operation and
work program of the Cleveland City Planning Commission.

I would
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now to relate two examples which will illustrate some of the issues in
which we have been involved and give you a feeling for our general
approach and operating style.

Later, I will try to elicit some

principles from these examples.
One of the first issues we chose to address was Cleveland's
housing problem.

There was general agreement among the Mayor, Council

and most city officials as to what the problem was:
of low- and moderate-income housing in the city.

there was a scarcity

The conventional remedy

was build more subsidized housing wherever such construction was politically feasible.

My staff was not convinced.

If conventional wisdom was correct,

why were rents in Cleveland so low and why were several neighborhoods
in Cleveland showing clear signs of widespread abandonment?

We decided

to undertake a research effort aimed at answering three basic questions:
1)

what was the nature of the housing problem in Cleveland?

2)

what

had been the nature and effectiveness of public response to the problem?
3)

what changes in public programs and policies would be needed to

achieve a more effective response to the problem?

Our detailed analysis was recently completed and published as the
Cleveland Housing Papers.

I believe it stands as one of the finest

series of analytical papers on housing ever done by a city planning
agency.

The analyses argue forcefully that the nature of the housing
problem has changed dramatically in Cleveland.
is incorrect.
units.

Conventional wisdom

No longer is there a scarcity of low income housing

Because of sweeping population shifts and generally low income,

a surplus of low income units - many of them substandard - has been
created.

We found that about 2,000 vacant and vandalized housing units
existed in Cleveland, and that the rate of residential abandonment
was about three dwelling units a day.

We found that, because of low

income, large numbers of Cleveland households simply could not afford
standard housing; that owners were not getting enough revenues' to be
able to maintain their buildings properly.

We became increasingly

convinced that the traditional emphasis of city housing policy on new
construction was unserviceable.

We came to believe that the attention

of City officials should be focused on saving the existing stock from
the growing threat of deterioration and abandonment.

On the basis of our analysis, we recommended a series of programs
including: a strong plea for a new Federal Housing Allowance Program
paid directly to qualified families for the rental of standard housing;
improved code enforcement in the still-salvagable residential areas of
Cleveland; interim uses for abandoned lots, a tightening-up of condemnation and tax-delinquency procedures; and $1.5 million for demolition
of vacant-vandalized structures.

We presented these findings and recommendations to the CityPlanning Commission - and got a good deal of local publicity.

We

briefed Mayor Perk and other key city officials, and lobbied with
essential support from our friends in the press for the necessary
demolition funds.

We asked for - and received - the Mayor's support

to lobby for a Housing Allowance Program within the HUD Washington
bureacracy which we did with some vigor.

We contacted all of our

area's U. S. Representatives and both Ohio Senators for their support
for housing allowances.

We wrote an article describing our study and

its findings and had it published in the ASPO magazine.

We sent copies

of the Cleveland Housing Papers to various academicians whom we hoped
would support our argument and help us lobby with the HUD bureaucracy
and their own area Congressmen.

And we have armed the Mayor with

testimony to present before Congressional committees in support of
housing allowances when the new housing bill is introduced.

The City Adminstration and City Council almost immediately gave
us the full $1% million we requested for demolition of vacant,
vandalized buildings out of Cleveland's first general revenue-sharing
check.

The prognosis for the other parts of the program package is

reasonably hopeful.

A Housing Allowance Program apparently will be

included in the new federal housing bill, and a good deal of work has
already taken place locally on code enforcement and condemnation
reform within the City.
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Example number two deals with transportation.

A few weeks

after I arrived in Cleveland, Mayor Stokes asked me to serve as his
representative on a City transit committee established to prepare a
program and grant application for federal funds in support of the
Cleveland Transit System.

CTS, which is owned by the City, was

(and is) suffering from the familiar ridership and revenue shortages
that characterize public transit everywhere.
simply to keep the system operating.

A way had to be found

Beyond that, no other objective

was discussed in any clear way.

The Committee completed its work quickly and submitted its proposal to the Department of Transportation.

The people at DOT,

anxious to assure comprehensiveness, told us to go away until we had
a joint City-County proposal.

We returned to our labors with some

County officials added to our roster and, lo, just such a joint proposal emerged which we then brought back to DOT for approval.

But the federal agency still was not satisfied that the joint
City-County proposal was sufficiently comprehensive; after all parts
of the larger region were urbanizing and transportation proposals
would have an impact there.

So the joint City-County committee was

reconstituted as a special subcommittee of our seven-county regional
agency; the scope of the study was broadened from one to five counties
and the study committee itself was broadened to 21 members of which

the outlying four counties appoint one representative each, the
business community appoints two, the Cuyahoga County Commissioners
appoint three, and the City of Cleveland appoints three.

The new committee and study area were now sufficiently "comprehensive" to satisfy federal requirements.

But somehow the goal of

the committee was no longer simply to keep CTS running, but to extend
rapid lines, provide an attractive alternative to the automobile,
unify and coordinate the 21 public and private transit systems in
the region, build a downtown distribution system and to transfer
CTS to some sort of regional agency which could use general tax funds
to supplement the farebox.

Once all this was accomplished, the

system's survival would be assured, and everybody would be happy.

Or

would they?

Interestingly, my staff and I thought "not necessarily."

For

while these reorganizations were taking place, our first transportation study entitled "Transportation and Poverty" was published.

Let

me quote briefly from its findings:

"In the course of opting for an automotive civilization, we have
provided unprecedented mobility for those who can take full
advantage of it.

But in the process, the national majority

has chosen to ignore completely the problems this civilization
creates for those who cannot drive or lack regular access to a
car.

As any resident of Cleveland can testify, if he is too
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young, too poor, too ill or too old to drive, there are
fewer and fewer places he can reach by conventional transit.
This is partly the result of the increased scatteration of
new developments taking place at low densities impossible to
achieve without the highway and the car, and partly because of
service cuts by public transit brought on by decreasing ridership and revenues.

It is not the purpose of this paper to argue for an end to
highway investment, but to attempt to modify and redress the
impact of present regressive transportation policies on the
poor, the elderly, the very young and the disadvantaged.

This group is substantial, indeed.

In 1956, 32% of all house-

holds, that is, about 79,000 households, in the City of Cleveland did not own cars.

Of the estimated 46,000 families with

annual incomes under $5,000, 46% owned no car.

Of all house-

holds headed by persons over 65, 48% or approximately 24,000
households owned no car.

In keeping with the Cleveland City Planning Commission's goal
of improving choices for people who have few, it is morally
imperative that this transit-dependent group be the prime
beneficiaries of changes in transportation policies.

The

overriding goal of transportation policy in the City of Cleve-

land must be to ensure a decent level of mobility to those
prevented by poverty or by a combination of modest income and
physical disability (including old age) from moving freely
about the metropolitan area."

Now, since improving the mobility of the transit dependent population is the Cleveland City Planning Commission's prime objective,
does the transfer of CTS to a regional agency automatically or
necessarily serve that end?

Does a downtown subway or suburban

rapid extensions confer any benefits on the transit-dependent?

Would

improved funding be used to relieve the restricted mobility of the
transit-dependent or to provide more transportation choices to the
suburban middle class?

Would the 5-County Transit Committee with

its business and regional political constituency, be overly concerned
with the needs of the transit-dependent population which is largely
confined to the City of Cleveland?

I would like to answer these questions definitively, but after
almost four years we are still in the process of finding out.

Over

that period my staff, myself and the Planning Commission have been
continually stressing the need for improved mobility for the transitdependent population as urgently as we can.

If we were the ultimate

decision-makers, the issue would be resolved; the politicians and local
institutions with a stake in the issue, however, have been ambiguous
in their support.

What have we as planners done to assure proper

attention to the issue at decision-time?
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As a planning professional, I have lobbied for emphasis on the
needs of the transit-dependent via briefings with the Mayor, Council
members and other local political figures.

I have submitted papers

at AIP-DOT sponsored conferences, at AIP and ASPO annual conferences
and at two AIP Biennial Policy Conferences.

I have been in constant

touch with my opposit numbers in the DOT bureaucracy.

Key members of

my staff have engaged in similar efforts.

The Cleveland City Planning Commission has been supportive in
passing numerous resolutions stating and re-stating its concern for
the transit-dependent, and setting conditions clearly beneficial to
this group in any future transfer of CTS to a regional agency.

In my role as member of the Five-County Transit Committee, its
Consultant Screening Committee, its Executive.Committee and on the
Board of the seven-county regional planning agency, I have pressed
for proper recognition to this issue.

To some extent, our efforts have been successful.

In its goal

statement the 5-County Transit Study has recognized the improved
mobility of the transit-dependent as its highest priority.

After

much barganing and committee in-fighting, we have convinced the
5-County Study to select our candidates for prime contractor, for
sub-contractor for the vital transit-dependent element of the plan
and for project manager.

We have also fought for and won adequate

funding for the transit-dependent element of the study.

We supported
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all these consulting organizations and individuals because they
indicated an empathy for our own policy focus on the needs of the
transit-dependent as opposed to other firms and individuals offering
what we considered only the standard civil engineering approach to the
s tudy.

Yet, after all this effort, I am not overly-confident that our
view will prevail in the final resolution of the issue.

The seven-

county planning agency has announced, as its first transit proposal,
support for a $10 million 1^-mile extension of the existing Shaker
Rapid from fashionable - and rich - Shaker Heights to fashionable and richer - Pepper Pike.

And the 5-County Transit Study has

presented as its preliminary package, a series of high-priced proposals that under our analysis, appear to confer massive benefits to
the rich and middle-class in the region and only marginal benefits to
the transit-dependent population in the city.

But the game is not over.

As professional long-term players,

representing an important City agency, our point-of-view must be
accommodated.

If the business community is to get its downtown

subway and the suburban politicos their rapid extensions, we are
determined to get adequate attention to our transit-dependent clients.
If we do not, we have made clear our intent to publicly (and loudly)
defect and disavow the study, an action that could jeopardize the
entire study's chances for success.

By continuing to try to influence

... , • .
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the study, the Mayor and other key decision-makers, we may still
exert enough leverage to win out after all.

These two examples are representative of many of the issues in
which we are involved.

What is it that they represent?

What do they

suggest about the operations of the Cleveland City Planning Commission which might be of some value to other planning agencies and the
planning profession in general?

First, we planners have been too timid - and that criticism is
directed most specifically at directors of planning agencies.

Based

on our experience in Cleveland, advocacy or equity planners can survive.

It seems clear that planning agencies which cast before

themselves a vision of a just society as their overriding goal, and
then work seriously toward that goal, can endure and even prosper.
Surely risks exist, but it seems to us that they have been overdramatized.

As a profession we have been seriously compromized by

considerations of job-security, political safety, and the limitations
of contemporary American practice.

The housing and mass transit examples are only two areas of our
program.

In all our work in Cleveland we have tried to be responsible

to the goal of equity.

We have asked that essential question:

"Who

gets - who pays" in our analysis of all proposals coming before us.

And when proposals have led away from greater equity, we have designed
and attempted to sell alternatives under which the clear benefits
would go to those most in need.

In four years, under two Mayors who could not be more dissimilar a Black, liberal Democrat, and a White, conservative Republican —

our

agency has steadily acquired greater influence, prestige and success.

An essential ingredient in that success has been professional
competence.

Our program analyses and recommendations are informed

both by our point of view and by our technical expertise.

They are

not based on liberal rhetoric or our own "feel" of an issue.

Politi-

cal decision-makers are uninterested in hearing more of the standard
rhetoric from the left; and their political "feel" is lots better
than ours.

The presentation of policies and programs to the Mayor, Councilmen and other key political and business figures requires staff with
basic, critical skills and abilities.

Ability to deal with voluminous

statistical information, familiarity with both public and private
financial practices and techniques; an understanding of basic economic
precepts, a working knowledge of the law and an appreciation of the
rules of bureaucracies are crucial characteristics of staff engaged
in this work.

More often than not, the successful advocacy of a

desirable program or legislative change will rely entirely upon the
quality of staff work involved.

Certainly the only legitimate power

the Commission can count on in these matters is the power of information, analysis and insight they bring to bear.

If you are interested

in affecting outcomes, then, expertise is essential.

Second, the Cleveland City Planning Commission is "activist" in
the sense that it is not willing to play either the role of rubber
stamp or civic "watchdog", but actively develops policies and programs
and attempts to implement them.
decision process:

This stance focuses directly on the

What are the key issues coming up?

What institution

is empowered to decide whether a program will be approved?
the key actors?
made?

Who may influence them?

Who are

When will the decision be

What information is likely to be relevant to those who decide?

How much will the program cost?
residents of Cleveland?

How will the expenditure benefit the

What are unintended but likely side-effects?

In this situation, the planning director and senior staff must make
judgments concerning issues and problems which may reach legislative
form in the next six months or year.

They must predict who will

decide on what issue and they must program staff time and resource
for efforts designed to bring information and analysis to bear on the
problem.

They must develop the program that the Planning Commission

will support during discussions prior to decision.

They must seek

support for the program among those who will ultimately decide.

All
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of this takes time and attention; and it is not always successful.
But since impacting the decision is the goal, the staff time must
be allocated, and this further affects the style and program of the
agency.

We can be seen, then, as an agency deeply concerned with

implementation as much as with policy formulation and analysis.

Third, the political process is unlikely to provide planners with
clear statements indicating goals or objectives.

In some cases,

political leaders dispute objectives; in many cases they simply
ignore them.

In most cases, the planner lacks any authoritative

political statement of what the problem is, what it is that must be
maximized, or minimized or under what constraints.

And his efforts

to obtain such a statement are likely to end in frustration.

Urban

governments persist in avoiding any close identification of goals or
objectives.

They must.

The purposes of some programs are cynical;

the objectives of many more are multiple, and maintaining disparate
sources of support for them requires ambiguity.

Moreover, men who

run for office know far more poignantly than researchers do the odds
against getting change actually accomplished.

They know, therefore,

that large promises made with specificity are invitations of proof of
failure two or four years later.

Yet large promises must be made.

Hence vagueness.

This is a decided hardship for those planners who, in the tradition of our profession, look to political leaders for concise
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objectives.

But we have an overriding goal that simple equity demands

first and priority attention be given to the task of promoting wider
choices and opportunities for those groups and individuals who have
few, if any, choices.
analyses.

This goal gives great clarity and power to our

It also puts us in the position of seeking clients in the

hope of improving the equity of any given situation or in simply
improving the quality of the political process itself.

In itself,

this is a great opportunity.

The fourth principle relates to the long pull and the need for
planners to stay put and use all their resources in fighting for their
objectives.

The transit and housing examples related earlier cover

a span of about four years.

Just now the critical decisions are being

made on the elements of the transit service package which will be
presented to the voters for approval, and they are very large decisions
indeed.

If the planners involved in this issue had played their usual

game of two-year musical-chairs while simply processing data for the
pre-conceived notions of political decision-makers, we would have no
opportunity to influence this decision whatever.

If we planners want to treat urban problems as simply a source
of employment and institution-building, that is one matter^.

But if

we seriously want to improve conditions in the cities we must understand that the challenge requires much more than our traditional
responses.

The planner is very likely to want to address a problem
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only in terms^of his own professional skills, and then to stop.

He

performs his regression, or builds his simulation; he identifies an
apparent solution.

He then represents it as lucidly and persuasively

as he can to his client, the Planning Commission, and then he stops.
Gentlemen —
outcomes.

that is not enough if we seriously intend to affect
Those who propose ends, and who care about outcomes must

care about means.

We must be prepared to spend some time and take

some risks in improving city conditions and in moving toward greater
equity which comes to almost the same thing.

Planners who are serious

about their work must understand more clearly that both decisionmaking and implementation are processes, not acts, and that both require their protracted participation.

So our work is cut out for us.

We must better understand our

moral and technical responsibilities as planners within a system
driven by powerful economic and ideological forces.

We must learn to

interact with political and other public officials on their terms and
accept our share of responsibility and risk in the day-to-day decision
process.

If we do, within the context I have described, we may play

a major role in the future of the city; if we continue with our
traditional focus on land use, zoning and design, then planners will
perform some useful functions, but will play only a minor role in
solving America's urban problems.

